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Abstract
Background: Team-based group communications using checklists are widely advocated to achieve shared
understandings and improve patient safety. Despite the positive effect checklists have on collaborations and
reduced postoperative complications, their use has not been straightforward. Previous research has described
contextual factors that impact on the implementation of checklists, however there is limited understanding of the
issues that impede team participation in checklist use in surgery. The aim of this prospective study was to identify
and describe factors that drive team participation in safety checks in surgery.
Methods: We observed ten surgical teams and conducted 33 semi-structured interviews with 70 participants from
nursing, surgery and anaesthetics, and the community. Constant comparative methods were used to analyse textual
data derived from field notes and interviews. Observational and interview data were collected during 2014–15.
Results: Analysis of the textual data generated from the field notes and interviews revealed the extent to which
members of the surgical team participated in using the surgical safety checklist during each phase of patient care.
These three categories included: ‘using the checklist’; ‘working independently’; and, ‘communicating checks with
others’. The phases in the checking process most vulnerable to information loss or omission were sign in and sign out.
Conclusions: Team participation in safety checks depends on a convergence of intertwined factors; namely, team
attributes, communication strategies and checking processes. A whole-of-team approach to participation in surgical safety
checks is far more complex when considering the factors that drive participation. Strategies to increase participation in
safety checks need to target professional communication practices and work processes such as workflow which curtail
team members’ ability to participate.
Background
The 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, “To err is
human” estimated that between 44,000 and 98,000 pa-
tients die each year as a result of medical errors in the
United States [1]. Other studies suggest that the inci-
dence rate lies somewhere between 2.9 % (499/17,192)
[2] and 16.6 % (2,353/14,179) [3]. Of concern is that
nearly 45 % (7,712/17,192) of adverse events (AE) occur
in surgery, with a median of 43.5 % (interquartile range
39.4 to 49.6 %) of these considered as avoidable [4]. The
incidence of major complications as a result of surgery is
estimated to be between 23.3 % (272/1,177) [5] and 77 %
(112/146) [6] of inpatient surgical procedures. In an
effort to reduce AE and complication rates in surgery,
the World Health Organisation (WHO) launched the
Safe Surgery Saves Lives campaign in 2008 [7], advocat-
ing the use of checklists worldwide.
Since its introduction in over 122 countries, the WHO
Surgical Safety Checklist (SSC) has been the focus of
many published studies [8–13], including several meta-
analyses [14–16], suggesting associated reductions in pa-
tient mortality and postoperative complication rates
when the SSC is used. The SSC is intended as an ‘aid
memoir’ for including key information or actions that
may otherwise be overlooked or forgotten, thus ensuring
timely and consistent communication among surgical
team members [2, 3]. The 19 item checklist has three
time points that reflect the take-off, cruise and landing
phases of the aviation industry [7, 17]. Before anaesthesia
induction sign in, the surgical team confirms patient
identity, surgical site, anaesthetic concerns and estimated
* Correspondence: b.gillespie@griffith.edu.au
1NHMRC Centre for Research Excellence in Nursing (NCREN), Centre for Health
Practice Innovation (HPI), Menzies Health Institute Qld (MHIQ), Griffith University,
Parklands Drive, Gold Coast Campus, Gold Coast, QLD 4222, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2016 Gillespie et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Gillespie et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2016) 10:3 
DOI 10.1186/s13037-015-0090-5
blood loss. Prior to skin incision, the entire team per-
forms time out, a surgical ‘pause’ where anticipated crit-
ical events are reviewed, sterility and antibiotic status is
confirmed, and imaging is verified and displayed. Before
the patient leaves the operating room (OR), the sign out
phase includes confirmation of the surgical count, pro-
cedure name, handling of tissue specimens, and ensuring
equipment issues are addressed.
Despite the benefits associated with the SSC, recent
research suggests universal implementation and contin-
ued use in the clinical environment is often inconsistent,
and very much driven by the context [14, 18–20]. En-
ablers to SSC use include physician engagement and
leadership [18], tailoring and customizing the checklist
to the local context [18, 20], and creating opportunities
for stakeholder reflection on checklist implementation
and modification, giving them greater ownership of the
process [18]. Common identified barriers to sustained
use of checklists in surgery include haphazard introduc-
tion [19, 20], perceived duplication or redundancy of in-
formation [19], professional identification [18, 20, 21]
and team culture [18, 19]. The barriers and enablers to
implementation identified across these studies predom-
inantly encompass organizational and individual factors.
However, findings from previous studies in this area
[22–25] suggest that checklist implementation does not al-
ways equate to compliance. In fact, two studies [24, 26]
found that despite 100 % documented completion of the
sign in phase of the checklist, most of the individual items
were either not addressed as intended, or not addressed at
all. Variation in compliance rates across studies has been
noted in many of the prospective studies conducted in this
area [10, 22, 27, 28]. Failure to consistently review all check-
list items may increase patients’ risk of preventable ‘never
events’ such as wrong site/side surgery or retained foreign
bodies [29]. Consequently, identifying issues that act as bar-
riers and enablers to checklist implementation may inform
the development of knowledge translation strategies de-
signed to increase item usage and overall uptake.
Methods
This prospective study is part of a larger mixed methods
knowledge translation study where the aim was to evalu-
ate the feasibility and acceptability of a multifaceted be-
haviour change intervention on SSC use. The aim of this
prospective study was to identify and describe factors
that act as barriers or enablers to team participation in
SSC checks.
Setting and sample
The study setting was a 550 bed Australian tertiary centre,
specializing in paediatrics, orthopaedics, vascular, cardiac,
obstetrics/gynaecology, general, urology, ENT, plastics,
neuro, ophthalmology, trauma, and thoracic surgeries. At
the time of data collection, the perioperative department
had 16/20 ORs commissioned and was staffed by over 300
nurses, physicians and ancillary staff. At this facility, ap-
proximately 20,000 surgical procedures are performed
each year.
The selection of surgical procedures and participants
was purposive and clinical participants were drawn from
anaesthetics, surgery, and nursing, working across 12
surgical specialities. Healthcare consumers were selected
based on their ability to reflect on their previous experi-
ences as a surgical patient in the context of using check-
lists as a safety tool to prevent harm. Maximum
variation in sampling [30] was used to achieve diversity
in participants’ experiences and perceptions of team
communications using the SSC, based on their profes-
sional and personal backgrounds.
Data collection
Observational and interview data were collected over
8 months during 2014–15. Data collection methods in-
cluded structured observations, field notes, and individ-
ual and group interviews. The observational audit was
performed by a member of the research team who was
an experienced OR nurse, and trained in observational
methods. The researcher used a standardized data col-
lection tool in a tabular format and collected data on
checklist item usage rates and team member presence
and participation across the three phases (i.e., sign in,
timeout, sign out) of the checking process. ‘Participation’
in checking processes was considered in relation to behav-
iours such as active listening, asking questions and/or
answering queries, and passing on clinical information
when relevant, to others. Checklist items were deemed in-
complete if an anaesthetist, surgeon, and nurse did not
confirm patient, site, procedure or any other relevant
checks of each phase of the checklist.
Interviews were semi structured and were used to
elicit clinician participants’ perspectives about the bar-
riers and enablers of SSC implementation and use in
practice. Interviews with the healthcare consumers were
conducted to establish consumers’ expectations as recip-
ients of surgical care. Semi structured interviews were
digitally recorded and transcribed per verbatim. Prior to
each interview, all participants completed a demographic
questionnaire of characteristics (i.e., age, gender, educa-
tion, clinical role) to contextualize the findings and de-
scribe the group. Participants were interviewed either
individually or in groups, depending on their availability.
Interviews were conducted at the participant’s conveni-
ence, away from the clinical environment. Group inter-
views were discipline-specific and were conducted with
staff who belonged to the same staff category to diffuse
potential status differentials [31]. Interview questions
were based on Mitchie et al. [32]. ‘Theoretical Domains
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Framework’ (TDF) which targets aspects of individual
behaviour relative to knowledge, skills, professional role/
identity, self-efficacy, outcome expectations, motivation/
goals, environmental context/resources, and social norms.
For instance, to determine whether knowledge was a bar-
rier or an enabler, we asked clinician participants, “What
is your understanding of the purpose of the SSC?”, and,
“Can you describe how you do the SSC?” Examples of
questions asked of healthcare consumers included, “Do
you believe that using a checklist can help reduce mis-
takes or errors?”, and, “Do you think that the checklist
could improve communication among staff members in
surgery?” The lead author performed all interviews and
the number of interviews was determined by the point
at which data saturation occurred.
Ethical considerations
Approvals were given by the hospital and university
Human Research Ethics Committees. Participants were
given an invitational letter detailing study information
and were required to sign a consent form. They were ad-
vised of their right to confidentiality and anonymity and
to withdraw from the study at any time.
Data analysis and rigour
From the textual analysis of field notes and interview
transcripts, analysis occurred in an iterative manner to
develop the subcategories and categories. The process of
category development involved breaking down, compar-
ing, and conceptualizing data to enable recognition of
emerging patterns to identify major categories and their
subcategories [33–35]. The extracted categories and
their corresponding explanatory data were cross-
checked among researchers to ensure consensus. In data
analysis, investigator triangulation was used as all mem-
bers of our interdisciplinary research team contributed
to the findings using varied perspectives and discipline-
specific expertise [36]. In keeping with an integrated
knowledge translation approach [37], we presented the
findings to our participants to verify their authenticity
and accuracy at each stage of the analysis. Data satur-
ation at the point of analysis was evident when no new
information or categories emerged.
The hallmarks of rigour concerning credibility, audit-
ability, transferability and triangulation [30, 33, 36] have
been considered in this study. Credibility was evident in
relation to giving participants opportunity to corroborate
the authenticity of thematic findings with their experi-
ences. An audit trail, supported by memos, linked to
pieces of data confirmed the categories and subcategor-
ies. Transferability of findings to other similar settings
was achieved through using a wide variety of partici-
pants that included clinicians and health consumers. We
used a triangulated approach on two levels: First, we
used different data sources enabling cross checking, con-
firmation and completeness of the data [36]. Second, the
interdisciplinary approach we used enabled a compre-
hensive examination of the data set, reducing the poten-
tial for bias that is inherent in any study.
Results
Approximately 35 h of field observations were conducted
with 80 nurses, anaesthetists and surgeons working across
10 surgical teams in paediatrics, obstetrics/gynaecology,
general surgery, and urology. The length of surgery ranged
from 60 to 120 min (median 88 min, IQR 104 min). In
total, 33 interviews were conducted with 70 participants
in 10 focus groups and 23 individual interviews from
nursing, medicine and healthcare consumers (Table 1). A
total of 55 nurses, 11 physicians, and 4 healthcare con-
sumers were interviewed. Interviews lasted between 12
and 50 min. Most participants were female (77 %). Partici-
pants’ ages ranged from 22 to 76 years, with a mean age of
43.5 years (SD13.0 years). Analysis of the observational
audit, field notes and interviews informed the develop-
ment of three categories and their subcategories (Table 2).
A description of these categories follows.
Using the checklist
The category, using the checklist encompassed behav-
iours based on checking processes that occurred during
the three checklist phases. Interview participants de-
scribed how using the checklist enabled them to identify
deficits and/or discrepancies in important patient infor-
mation, thus minimizing or preventing potential errors
or mistakes. Having multiple opportunities to ‘check and
recheck’ information was considered imperative to keep-
ing the patient safe and these repeated checks created
“layers of safety” (Int 28, Surgeon). Some participants
however warned that using the surgical safety checklist
as a ‘tick-n-flick’ exercise may have the unintended effect
of leading to complacency because team members were
Table 1 Number of participants (n = 70) interviewed and the







10 Registered Nurses Individual • 3 Anaesthetics
• 5 Scrub/scout
• 2 PACU
9 Physicians Individual • 5 Anaesthetists
• 4 Surgeons
4 Surgical Patients Individual • 4 Healthcare Consumers




2 Physicians Group • 2 Anaesthetists
Abbreviations: PACU Post-anaesthetic recovery unit
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Table 2 Categories, subcategories and examples of supporting verbatim
Category Subcategory Examples of supporting Verbatim
Using the checklist Picking up problems • The consent said the patient was having his operation on the left hand. It was an emergency
operation late at night, the anaesthetist had taken the patient into theatre without talking to the
staff and proceeded to give the patient sedation. Then the nursing staff looked at it all and went
“nup”. This patient has got the wrong consent! (Int 10, RN)
• And everything should be about layers. So you know the front door should have a layer. The
anaesthetic bay should have a layer. The final time out is here. Where it’s most important that
everybody check things before any skin is cut…. (Int 28, Surgeon)
Prompting,
providing reminders
• And you’ve got reminders, whether it’s the specimen, or the diathermy pad. You know, just so that you’ve
completely followed through. It’s a good starting point, as a handover to the recovery phase. (Int 1, RN)
• I guess effectively it’s almost a tick and flick but occasionally something pops up in the process of ticking
and flicking there to remind you about something. (Int 26, Anaesthetist)
Tick-n-flick, going
through the motions
• The last bit is not done very well, the signout. That’s a tick tick tick thing. (Int 4, 5 RNs)
• If you are not careful about what you are doing, the patient will get checked in and if all the boxes are
ticked and nobody actually talks to the patient and confirms with the patient while they are awake that
the surgeon knows what they are doing, it doesn’t prevent anything. (Int 18, surgeon)
Checking and
rechecking
• So I always check, are you happy with consent prior to bringing the patient in or giving sedation.
I never do anything without one of the nurses. I don’t care if another doctor and the surgeon says
consent is there. Have the nurses seen consent? Because I think they are much better at checklists than
we are. (Int 8, Anaesthetist)
• ……you’re just basically double-checking everything, three, four, five million times, so it can slow down
your day then because you want to make sure that the patient comes first and their safety is imperative
in our role…. (Int 24, RN)
Modifying and
adapting
• We’ve added in cardiac, for example, to make sure that we got, we say “pacing wires”, so they are not
meant to be sent up. (Int 20, RN cardiac)
• I might have pinned the head in the wrong direction, but what worries me is that if I do a time out,
and then I pin the head that I might, because it’s very easy to go left, right, disorientation…. So I like
them [patients] completely positioned and then we do timeout. (Int 28, Surgeon)
Being inclusive and
patient-centred
• I felt as a patient I was included and so, nobody was trying to conceal anything from me. The nurse
in both cases was saying, “Ok, see the next question is” and so, you know, they will ask you about,
you know, previous history or difficulties……(Int 7, Healthcare Consumer)
• If the patient is awake and is having blocks of local anaesthetic and they say “time-out”, I say to the
patient “Just listen. If any information about you or what they are saying in the next two minutes is




Working in silos • We don’t work very well as a team. We have our two separate teams but we’re not a whole team.
We’ve got two pods. An anaesthetic pod and a surgical pod. (Int 4, 5 RNs)
• It’s “I have my job. You have your job” and I’m so like, why can’t we just help each other out? It
seriously takes two seconds. You come in to the anaesthetics bay, you ask the patient usually five
questions – name, date of birth, check the UR number, what are they having done, you check the
consent form, you ask them if they have got any metal and when they last ate. (Int 13, RN)
Being task focussed • Fasting status is more of an anaesthetic nurse concern, but as a scrub or a scout I don’t… probably,
when I’m doing the second and third components of the check, I probably don’t think “oh when did
they last eat”. I’m concerned about that if I’m in a different role, but when I’m just a scrub scout in the
theatre, I probably don’t…. (Int 1, RN)
• The anaesthetic nurse does the sign in bit by themselves. We usually go in and do our own little bit
but it’s not the way that it’s meant to be done but it’s getting done and the sign out is just pointless
all together. (Int 4, 5 RNs)
Being discipline-centric • But it’s the communication between the surgical team and the anaesthetic team is probably something
that needs to be improved on. I guess it’s because we’re focused on two completely different aspects
of this patient. One is focused solely on the airway and that they stay alive, and the surgical team are
just… purely to get them in and out. (Int 4 5 RNs)
• I don’t think they really pay attention to it [anaesthetic checklist items]. They [scrub nurses] pay
attention to their own check, despite it being very important and a lot of it in their check as
well.” (Int 15, RN anaesthetics)
Leading the process • I work both publicly and privately and somebody will call out the final check just before knife to skin.
That’s what we would call timeout and I think that’s probably where I see my role, certainly as the
anaesthetist, is often leading the timeout, certainly actively participating. (Int 8, Anaesthetist)
• What I try to do is get everybody together, I try to get the wardsman and the theatre assistant,
because they need to know the positioning of the patient, and if they don’t know ahead of time
what the positioning of the patient is, then how can they do it? (Int 9, Anaesthetist)
Working in isolation • An example, this back bit with the sign-in bit, the scrub scout always comes to the anaesthetic nurse
and says you haven’t ticked your bit. It’s like, did you watch the DVD? It doesn’t say that’s the
anaesthetic nurse bit. (Int 20, RN cardiac)
• The reality is, the anaesthetic nurse will fill this bit in, and she [sic] will leave blank the prosthesis
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merely ‘going through the motions’ without listening to,
or thinking about the information being collected. Surgi-
cal team members believed that ‘modifying and adapting’
the checklist enabled them to tailor their care to the par-
ticular needs of the patient as well as reflect the nuances
of different surgical specialities. However some partici-
pants believed that the ability to modify the checklist or
checking process had to be carefully balanced with the
need to standardize the items covered in the checks to
ensure that important information was communicated
and was not lost or omitted during handover exchanges.
Another component to checklist use was about ‘being
inclusive and patient-centred’—to ensure that the pa-
tient, where possible was given the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the conversation around their details and to
speak up when the information was inaccurate. From a
patient’s perspective, healthcare consumer interviewees
believed that the conversation with the patient around
the checklist items minimized the “distance between you
[as patient] and the healthcare professional” (Int 7,
Healthcare Consumer).
Working independently
The category, working independently illustrated team
attributes that shaped the ways surgical teams
coordinated checklist activities, and which was largely,
defined by their roles, and the associated task-related
workflows. The majority of clinical participants believed
that physicians should ‘take ownership’ and ‘lead the
process’ of checking, particularly during the time out
phase. While they did not always lead timeout, physi-
cians advocated strongly that they should coordinate the
timeout check as they ultimately had responsibility for
the patient. In relation to overall accountability, this
statement was typical of sentiments held by surgeon par-
ticipants, “I'm the one who takes the absolute risk” (Int
18, Surgeon). During the observational audit, anaesthe-
tists and surgeons were observed to initiate 20 and 40 %
of time out checks respectively. The influence of ‘being
task focussed’, ‘working in isolation’ and ‘working in silos’
was obvious in the way team members emphasized
discipline-specific information and the limited coordin-
ation in checks conducted as a collective. Throughout
the audit period, we observed that anaesthetic and
scrub/scout nurses appeared to be automatically allo-
cated different sections of the checklist. For example,
during sign in, anaesthetic and scrub/scout nurses were
regularly observed performing and documenting (tick-
ing) their checks independently of each other, although
these checks were part of the first phase of checks.
Table 2 Categories, subcategories and examples of supporting verbatim (Continued)
and the essential imaging, and when the scrub scout … And then we leave those blank, and then





• I’ll read the identification on the patient and get one of the nurses to ensure their consent, so they’ll
double-check it and will ensure their consent on the site and obviously I will make sure that the
surgeon is in the room at the time and I won’t let the nurses do it without ensuring that the
surgeon is in the room. (Int 8, Anaesthetist)
• And sometimes, the anaesthetic nurse will just pop the head in, in the theatre and say, “Have you
got all the prosthesis?” You say, “Yeah.” Because you’re also opening and getting ready. So they
just come in and ask …. And, and I’ll often check the screen to make sure that that patients’ scans
are on the screen. (Int 29, RNs x 5)
Verbalising
information
• We should just verbalise it more, really. We’ve probably always done it. You know, you always check if
your specimens are labelled, the equipment was okay, it’s what you always do but this is just a
document that says you’ve done it. I think we just don’t verbalise that we’ve done it because it’s
unsaid.…(Int 2 8 RN)
• And then the time out, that’s done with everyone, we also incorporate stuff from the sign in,
because we discuss antibiotics at that stage. Because it’s there in there, but we discuss it before
the operation. (Int 3, 8 Anaesthetic RNs)
Handing over • But it all goes back to being handed over at the beginning. It always comes back to what is on
it at the beginning when we’re passed on the information. I’ve had twice now, children come from
the ward with no parent and no nurse to handover. (Int 3, 8 Anaesthetic RNs)
• It’s usually… the anaesthetist. But we also get a handover from the surgical nurse who comes in
and tells us what surgery they’ve [patient] had, perhaps what position they were in. If there were
any problems with that, if they’ve had local anaesthetic, if they’ve had drains, dressings. Whether
they were bleeding… Anything that might be relevant. (Int 6, 3 PACU RNs)
Asking meaningful
questions
• But those who are just used to doing tick and flick and not asking the deep meaningful questions,
struggle when the meaningful questions are first asked…… (Int 9, Anaesthetist)
• The best question on that safety checklist is implants or prosthetics. I ask patients “have you got
any implants or prosthetics in your body?” They look at you like, “what’s that?” “Anything like
metal work, pins, plates, screws, stents?” This is how I word it, “anything in your body you weren’t
born with?” I suppose implants; people think breast implants and prosthetics, maybe limbs or
something…. But it’s funny, as time goes on you figure out different ways of wording
questions. (Int 14, RN)
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These observations were confirmed in the interview
data. The notion of role demarcation was again rein-
forced in ‘being discipline-centric’ as team members
checked off particular checklist items based on their dif-
ferent discipline orientations.
Communicating checks with others
The category, communicating checks with others
highlighted the communication strategies used during
the checking process. Strategies such as ‘making sure,
double checking’, and ‘verbalizing information’ enabled
team members to develop a shared mental model, ensur-
ing that everyone was on the same page. The various
checks that occurred as part of the preoperative and
SSC permitted team members to reconfirm information
at different junctures to circumvent or avert potential er-
rors, inconsistencies or omissions in relation to consent,
procedure/laterality/proximity, imaging, or allergies.
Likewise, the deliberate act of verbalizing information
offered participants the opportunity to engage in a dia-
logue, especially during time out. Clinical participants
advocated strongly that the time out check in particular,
needed to be more “patient centric” and done while the
patient was still awake and able to contribute to the con-
versation, rather than after anaesthetic induction. Nurse
participants considered the patient ‘hand over’ process
during sign in and patient transfer from the operating
room to the post anaesthetic recovery unit (PACU), crit-
ical to providing seamless, safe care. However when the
checklist was carried out as a “tick box” process, team
members’ ability to ‘ask meaningful questions’ and elicit
relevant information from patients and other team
members was reduced.
During field work, we mapped team communications in
relation to who was present and who participated in each
phase of the checking process, and the proportion of
checklist items that were verified and confirmed. Figure 1
illustrates the personnel involved in information ex-
changes at each juncture of the preoperative and surgical
safety checklists. Throughout sign in and sign out phases,
individual team members performed checks and commu-
nicated these as the need arose. Sometimes when the
scrub and scout nurses were busy setting up for the next
procedure, the anaesthetic nurse who had performed sign
in would enter the OR to handover information to scrub/
scout nurses about patient consent, procedure, and aller-
gies. Anaesthetists were not directly involved in the sign in
process, performed their own preoperative checks, asking
patients information about medical history, allergies, and
medications. Overall, total item completion of sign in
items was 52.1 %. Anaesthetic nurses were primarily in-
volved in sign in while only the scrub and scout nurses
performed sign out. We did not observe participation by
any other team members during sign out. Notably, sign in
and sign out were the most vulnerable checklist
phases because of the increased risk for information
loss or omission.
Team participation was at its greatest during the ‘time
out’ phase. That is, all team members were consistently
present and simultaneously exchanged clinical informa-
tion. During observations, timeout checklist items per-
taining to patient identity and procedure were always
stated and verified as a collective, while site/side was
checked and confirmed in 60 % of cases. Confirmation
of checklist items; critical and non-routine steps and pa-
tient-specific concerns was observed in 40 and 50 % of
cases respectively. Significantly, verbal confirmation of
equipment availability and sterility by the team was not
observed.
Discussion
In this study we have identified and described the factors
that drive team participation in safety checks. To facilitate
description, we mapped out team member participation
around the frequency/regularity of communication ex-
changes for each phase of the checklist. This study ex-
pands on the growing body of knowledge on this
important field and identifies potential points of vulner-
ability across the checking process. The drivers of surgical
safety checklist participation, while distinct, are interre-
lated: Team participation depends on a confluence of
interlinked factors; namely, team attributes, communica-
tion strategies and checking processes.
Team attributes
Our findings highlight that team attributes reflect inde-
pendence on an individual level versus interdependence
on a team level. Professional independence requires that
team members possess a tacit knowledge of regimens of
care, therefore permitting members to perform their
work tasks in a synchronized, unified manner [38].
Clearly being self-directed and working independently
may improve teamwork. Yet, a significant limitation to
professional independence is the siloing that comes as a
result of a focus on professional role, which constrains
opportunities for deliberate, open discussion among
team members as a collective [39]. Study participants’
expectations that team members would naturally per-
form their sections of the checklist, with little, if any
communication about how this would or should be done
reinforced a task-oriented approach. In some situations,
a task-orientated approach is required (e.g., patient in-
tubation, micro-surgery) but without explicit communi-
cation about performing the checks, vital information
may be missed and/or not passed on. Professional iden-
tity is accentuated by the “tribal affiliations” of members
and the contrast between physicians’ and nurses’ trad-
itional role responsibilities and teamwork behaviours in
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surgery [38, 40–42]. The disciplinary focus of team
members necessarily determines what information is
communicated and when, and with whom it is commu-
nicated [21]. Participants in our study described the im-
portance of having a designated leader for each phase of
the checklist, and resolutely believed that physicians should
lead time out. Findings from a recent realist synthesis of 35
studies found that ‘professional identity’ characterized
checklist implementation, which is discipline-specific and
more likely successful when physicians are actively leading
and participating in the process [18]. Team attributes is
the biggest factor in checklist participation and drives the
communication strategies used when performing the
phases of the checks.
Communication strategies
Our observational and interview findings suggest that
checklist communications especially during the sign in
and sign out phases occurred with individuals serendipit-
ously, rather than actively or deliberately. Minimal com-
munication in surgery is perceived as acceptable in OR
culture—ostensibly effective because it demonstrates clin-
ical competence which is considered the epitome of safety
[43, 44]. However, minimal or irregular team communica-
tions can also conceal inconsistencies or omissions in in-
formation [22, 25, 45]. Communicating task-related
information also enables greater situation awareness [42],
and thus allows team members to build shared mental
models. From a safety perspective, checklists are regarded
as a defence against adverse events [46], and when
handover is incomplete, the risk of error increases. Simi-
larly, when checks are performed as a tick box activity, the
risk of failure to detect errors increases [47]. In our study,
participants’ perceptions of risk seemed only apply to ac-
tive failures and not latent conditions. Notably, physicians
actively participated only in the timeout phase of the
checklist as they believed that this was the phase where er-
rors were most likely to be detected, a point highlighted in
previous work [48, 49]. Nevertheless, as study participants
identified, communications around the checks must be
meaningful and the information sought, relevant and use-
ful. That is, team members must ask pertinent questions
to attain accurate clinical information that will be used to
inform clinical decision making.
Checking processes
Our findings show that the timeout phase of the checklist
was most valued by participants, and hence, had the high-
est level of team participation and completion rates. Most
likely because timeout is the one time that the team whole
is together with the patient. The sign out process was not
a team-based activity, albeit that scrub and scout nurses
performed checks at various time points during the pro-
cedure while multitasking as opposed to performing these
checks during wound closure. Participants perceived sign
out items as nebulous and unclear, and held disparate per-
ceptions of when to initiate the sign out phase, likely be-
cause of conflicting individual workflows. Competing
workflows consequently led to potential discrepancies or
incomplete checks. That sign in and sign out checks were











































Holding Bay Induction Room Operating Room Operating RoomHolding Bay PACU
Patient Flow
Fig. 1 Personnel involved in team communications during phases of the Preoperative and Surgical Safety Checklists (elective procedures). Note:
P= Patient; WN= Ward Nurse; HB=Holding Bay Nurse; AN=Anaesthetic Nurse; ANA=Anaesthetist; S-S=Scrub-Scout Nurse; SUR=Surgeon; PACU=Post-
Anaesthetic Care Unit; PAC=PACU Nurse; W=Wardsman; = One-way exchange; = Two-way exchange; = Infrequent exchange;
= Exchange semi-frequent; = Frequent exchange; = Patient awake & included in ‘timeout’ checks
Gillespie et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2016) 10:3 Page 7 of 9
not confirmed and validated by the entire surgical team is
largely driven by team attributes and communication
strategies. Does it really matter that a team-based ap-
proach is not used for the sign in and sign out phases? De-
liberate confirmation with oral validation of checklist
items promotes closed loop communication and gives
others the opportunity to ask questions and clarify con-
cerns [50, 51]. Ideally involving the patient in confirmation
and validation of information during the sign in and time
out phases also adds another layer of safety. While errors
in specimen labelling were not observed during fieldwork,
several nurse participants reported mislabelling errors that
were picked up during the sign out phase. Implementing
behaviour change interventions aimed at educating and
reminding staff about performing the safety checks, i.e.,
who does what, when and how may partially address gaps
in participation. However, the broader issue around team
attributes requires behaviour change interventions that
address professional culture and systemic issues such as
workflow.
Strengths and limitations
Despite the use of a single hospital site; we spent exten-
sive time interviewing participants and stakeholders in-
cluding patients, thus allowing diverse perspectives.
Such diversity may allow conceptual transference of
findings to other similar settings. Twelve months prior
to the commencement of this study, hospital staff had
relocated to a larger facility, where the geographic layout
was very different. This may have impacted on team
communications because of the size of the facility. Fi-
nally, the dissimilar interview methods may have given
rise to different group dynamics but similar issues were
discussed and data saturation achieved.
Conclusions
While checklists are powerful tools to standardize key
work processes, they are often viewed as a ‘simple’ solution
to addressing consistency in team communications. Fur-
ther, the use of checklists is never formally taught in a
structured manner, making embedding checklists in clin-
ical practice even more challenging. Adopting a whole-of-
team approach to participation in surgical safety checks is
far more complex when considering the factors that drive
participation. Implementing checklists in surgery involves
complex social interactions between surgeons, anaesthe-
tists and nurses with the expectation of cooperation. We
recommend implementation strategies that specifically
target team communication processes and systemic issues
such as workflow.
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